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Looking the Other Way: A Critique of the
Fair-Lending Enforcement System
and a Plan to Fix It
Introduction
In 2001, the homeownership rate in the United States reached 67.8
percent—an all-time high. The benefits of homeownership were not
evenly spread across ethnic groups, however. In fact, the
homeownership rate was 74.3 percent for non-Hispanic whites, 48.4
percent for non-Hispanic blacks, and 47.3 percent for Hispanics
(U.S. Department of Housing and Urban Development 2002, Table
29). See Figure 1. These homeownership gaps undoubtedly have
many causes, but one of the key suspects is discrimination in
mortgage lending. The vast majority of households cannot buy a
house without a mortgage loan, and discriminatory barriers to
obtaining a mortgage could have a dramatic impact on
homeownership.
A hint about the possible role of discrimination in mortgage lending
comes from data collected under the Home Mortgage Disclosure
Act (HMDA), which records the ethnicity of the applicant and the
disposition of the application for virtually all the mortgage
applications filed in the United States. In 2000, black applicants
were twice as likely as white applicants to be turned down for a
loan, and Hispanic applicants were 41 percent more likely to be
turned down (FFIEC 2001b). These loan-approval disparities do not
prove that blacks and Hispanics face discrimination in mortgage
lending, because they do not account for possible differences in loan
features or borrower creditworthiness across groups. Nevertheless,
the differences are so dramatic that they focus attention on the
possibility that this type of discrimination might exist.
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Figure 1. Homeownership Rates, 1983-2001
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The purpose of this policy brief is to explore the possibility that
mortgage lending discrimination contributes to ethnic disparities in
homeownership, to evaluate the current fair-lending enforcement
system, and to propose reforms in that system to make it more
effective in uncovering—and, ultimately, eliminating—mortgage
lending discrimination.

What Is Discrimination in Mortgage Lending?
Discrimination in mortgage lending is prohibited by the Fair
Housing Act of 1968 (FaHA) and the Equal Credit Opportunity Act
of 1974 (ECOA).1 According to ECOA, as amended,
It shall be unlawful for any creditor to discriminate
against any applicant, with respect to any aspect of a
credit transaction—
(1)

2

on the basis of race, color, religion, national
origin, sex or marital status, or age (provided
the applicant has the capacity to contract).2
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ECOA also assigns fair-lending enforcement authority to the same
federal financial institutions (namely the Office of Thrift
Supervision, the Office of the Comptroller of the Currency, the
Federal Reserve, and the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation)
that oversee other aspects of lender behavior. Each of these
institutions regulates a different set of lenders. See FFIEC (2001a).
According to ECOA, enforcement authority for mortgage bankers,
which are non-depository lenders, is assigned to the Federal Trade
Commission.3
FaHA also takes a strong stand against lending discrimination. This
act gives enforcement power to the Departments of Housing and
Urban Development (HUD) and of Justice. In general, Justice is
entitled to prosecute cases involving a “pattern and practice” of
discrimination or an issue of national importance, whereas HUD is
the main agency for dealing with discrimination complaints.4
The Federal Financial Institutions Examination Council (FFIEC),
which consists of all the federal financial regulatory institutions,
provides a guide to the fair-lending regulations of its members. This
guide covers discrimination in many types of actions by lenders. For
example, this guide says that it would be discrimination for a lender
to “refuse to extend credit or use different standards in determining
whether to extend credit” based on an applicant’s membership in a
legally protected class (FFIEC 1999, ii).
These civil rights laws also make a key distinction between different
types of discrimination. As the FFIEC guide puts it:
The courts have recognized three methods of proof of
lending discrimination under the ECOA and the FH
Act:
•
•
•

Overt evidence of disparate treatment
Comparative evidence of disparate treatment
Evidence of disparate impact.

The existence of illegal disparate treatment may be
established either by statements revealing that a lender
explicitly considered prohibited factors (overt
evidence) or by differences in treatment that are not
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fully explained by legitimate nondiscriminatory factors
(comparative evidence).
When a lender applies a racially or otherwise neutral
policy or practice equally to all credit applicants, but
the policy or practice disproportionately excludes or
burdens certain persons on a prohibited basis, the policy
or practice is described as having a “disparate
impact.”(FFIEC 1999, ii-iv)
In this policy brief, the behaviors identified by the first two
“methods of proof,” overt and comparative, will be called
“disparate-treatment” discrimination, and careful attention will be
paid to both disparate-treatment and disparate-impact
discrimination. Indeed, recognizing that both types of discrimination
exist is critical for evaluating—and reforming—the fair-lending
enforcement system.
Finally, a case involving disparate-impact discrimination has three
steps (FFIEC 1999). The first step is to determine whether a practice
has a disparate impact on a legally protected class of people. The
second step is to determine whether the practice can be justified on
the grounds of business necessity, and the third step is to determine
whether there exists an alternative practice that achieves the same
business objectives without the same disparate impact. Disparateimpact discrimination in lending is said to exist if (a) an
enforcement agency finds that a lending practice has a disparate
impact on a protected group and either (b) the lender cannot show
that the practice is justified on the grounds of business necessity or
(c) the enforcement agency shows that this disparate impact can be
avoided through the use of an alternative practice that achieves the
same business objectives. Although these steps are well established
in law, the precise legal requirements for building a prima facie case
for discrimination, part (a), or for building a business necessity
defense, part (b), are not yet clear (Mahoney 1998).

4

Stephen L. Ross and John Yinger

Why Should We Care about Discrimination in
Mortgage Lending?
Nobody claims to be in favor of mortgage lending discrimination, of
course, but some people do not believe that we need to worry about
it. Discrimination is a thing of the past, they say, and no lender
could survive in today’s competitive market if it practiced
discrimination. For three principal reasons, we believe that this
position is incorrect and that this nation should still care about
discrimination in mortgage lending.5 These reasons are the lack of
change in the HMDA data, the results of a major study of mortgage
lending discrimination, and the possibility of extensive disparateimpact discrimination.

Lack of Change in the HMDA Data
If discrimination were disappearing from mortgage markets, one
would expect the loan-approval disparities in the HMDA data to be
declining over time.6 This has not been the case. In fact, the
black/white loan-denial ratio has fluctuated around 2.0 since 1995,
with a high of 2.07 in 1998 and a low of 1.92 in 1999.7 The current
ratio, 2.0, is slightly higher than the 1995 ratio, 1.95. See Figure 2.
The Hispanic/white denial ratio has fluctuated around the lower
value of 1.5, but it exhibits a similar pattern over time, with a
relatively high value in 1998 and a relatively low value in 1999. Its
current value, 1.41, is slightly below its value in 1995, 1.43.

Evidence from the Boston Fed Study
An important study based on data from 1990, Munnell et al. (1996),
found extensive evidence of mortgage lending discrimination. This
study, which is known as the Boston Fed Study because its authors
were researchers at the Boston Federal Reserve Bank, supplemented
the HMDA data with extensive information on individual loan
applications, including measures of the applicant’s credit history.
On the basis of these data, this study found that black and Hispanic
applicants are 82 percent more likely to be turned down for a loan
than are equivalent white applicants.8 This result provides strong
evidence of discrimination.
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Figure 2. Conventional Home-Purchase Loan-Denial Ratios by Year
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This study’s methodology has been criticized by many scholars.
However, several careful examinations of its data and methods
conclude that the study’s main result cannot be explained by most of
the issues raised by these critics, including omitted credit variables,
data errors, and misspecification of the estimating equation.9 See
Carr and Megbolugbe (1993), Glennon and Stengel (1994), and
Ross and Yinger (forthcoming).
One issue raised by several critics appears to have more bite.
Specifically, the Boston Fed Study cannot rule out the possibility
that underwriting criteria differ, for legitimate business reasons,
across lenders and that the lenders selected by black and Hispanic
applicants are not as well suited to their credit needs as are the
lenders selected by whites (Glennon and Stengel 1994; Stengel and
Glennon 1999). In this context, “legitimate” variation in
underwriting standards is defined as variation that arises because
different lenders draw on different pools of applicants and therefore
have different experiences about the impact of various credit
characteristics on the probability that a borrower will default.
Any such legitimate variation should be associated with the
characteristics of a lender’s loan portfolio, that is, with the

6

Stephen L. Ross and John Yinger

characteristics of the loans a lender provides. By adding many
characteristics of loan portfolios to the Boston Fed Study’s data set,
Ross and Yinger (forthcoming) are able to test for this possibility.
They find that underwriting standards do, indeed, vary across
lenders based on portfolio characteristics, but that accounting for
this has no impact in the estimated minority-white disparity in loan
approval. Legitimate differences in underwriting standards cannot
explain the Boston Fed Study’s main result, and one is left with the
conclusion that this result is a sign of discrimination.
The Boston Fed Study is based on 1990 data and it has not been
replicated.10 As a result, there exists no direct evidence about the
extent of discrimination in mortgage lending at the current time.
Nevertheless, the Boston Fed Study provides the best available
evidence and the HMDA data for the last several years provide no
indication that discrimination is declining.11

The Potential Importance of Disparate-Impact
Discrimination
The third reason for concern is that disparate-impact discrimination
in mortgage lending could be widespread, even if, as several
scholars have argued, disparate-treatment discrimination is no
longer a serious problem. The potential importance of disparateimpact discrimination is suggested by two principal arguments.
First, disparate-treatment discrimination can readily be transformed
into disparate-impact discrimination. As clearly explained by
Lundberg (1991), economic agents who want to practice disparatetreatment discrimination but who are prevented from doing so may
be able to achieve virtually identical outcomes by using
characteristics other than group membership to predict which group
an applicant belongs to.12 This approach only works, of course, if
there exist characteristics that are correlated with group
membership. In the case of lending, this is clearly the case; on
average, black and Hispanic loan applicants have poorer credit
qualifications than do white applicants.
The possibilities for exploiting the correlation between credit
characteristics and group membership are demonstrated by Buist,
Linneman, and Megbolugbe (1999) and by Blackburn and
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Vermilyea (2001), who show, using two different data sets, that the
loan-approval decisions of lenders can be explained either by setting
a lower approval rate for blacks and Hispanics than for whites with a
common set of credit standards across lenders or by devising lenderspecific underwriting standards that also predict group
membership.13 The latter possibility is, of course, disparate-impact
discrimination.
The second argument for concern about disparate-impact
discrimination is that it can easily be built into a credit-scoring or
other automated underwriting scheme, even one that appears to treat
all groups equally.
This argument is important because of the recent growth in the uses
of these schemes.14 Several private companies now provide credit
scores, which are formulas that translate a loan applicant’s financial
characteristics and credit history into a score designed to predict
default on a loan. These formulas are based on a statistical analysis
of the impact of applicant characteristics on loan performance,
usually measured by loan default, for a sample of previous loans.
More general automated underwriting schemes bring in additional
explanatory variables, such as the nature of the loan or of the
property being purchased. For example, Fannie Mae and Freddie
Mac, key institutions in the secondary mortgage market, have
developed automated underwriting schemes for use by loan
originators who want to sell mortgages to these institutions. In some
cases, automated underwriting schemes are so complete that
mortgage transactions based on them are conducted entirely over the
internet.
As several scholars have pointed out, automated underwriting
schemes make disparate-treatment discrimination more difficult
because they provide a detailed formula linking applicant
characteristics to loan decisions, without any consideration of an
applicant’s race, ethnicity, or gender. See Avery et al. (2000); Buist,
Linneman, and Megbolugbe (1999); and Yezer (1995). Indeed, in
the extreme case of loans provided over the internet, the lender may
not ever observe the applicant and may therefore not be able to use
different underwriting criteria for different groups. The growth in
automated underwriting does not make disparate-treatment
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discrimination impossible, because most schemes leave some room
for lender judgment, but it appears to lower the likelihood that this
type of discrimination takes place.
These scholars also point out, however, that automated underwriting
does not rule out the possibility of disparate-impact discrimination.
Indeed, an apparently group-neutral procedure for developing an
automated underwriting scheme can lead to disparate-impact
discrimination whenever groups differ on credit characteristics that
are unobserved by the lender, such as the probability that a relative
will be able to provide financial assistance in the case of
unemployment or some other negative income shock.
Suppose, for example, that an automated underwriting scheme is
based on a statistical analysis that ignores group membership
altogether, which appears to be the procedure behind existing
schemes.15 In this case, the estimated underwriting weights of
observed credit characteristics capture not only the relationship
between these characteristics and the probability of default, which is
entirely legitimate, but also, to the extent that the observed credit
characteristics are correlated with group membership, the role of
average unobserved credit characteristics for each group, which
lenders are not allowed to consider.16 The only way to avoid
disparate-impact discrimination in this situation is to base the
underwriting weights in the scheme on a statistical analysis that
includes group membership variables but then to ignore the impact
of these variables in making a loan-approval decision. By leaving
group membership variables out of its statistical analysis, therefore,
an automated underwriting scheme may appear to be group neutral
but is, in fact, introducing disparate-impact discrimination.
More generally, it is possible to test whether one automated
underwriting scheme represents a legitimate, that is, nondiscriminatory improvement over another scheme by determining
whether it improves the predictions of loan performance within each
group (Ross and Yinger forthcoming). Disparate-impact
discrimination arises when a scheme selects either the variables used
to rate an application or the weights placed on these variables so as
to predict the group to which an applicant belongs. Improved
prediction for the set of applicants from a single group, say, whites,
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obviously cannot be affected by provisions that predict group
membership. As a result, switching to a scheme that is common
across groups and that improves within-group predictions is nondiscriminatory, whereas switching to a scheme that improves overall
predictions only by doing a better job of identifying group
membership by definition involves disparate-impact discrimination.

What Is the Fair-Lending Enforcement System?
As explained earlier, many federal institutions share responsibility
for enforcing the ECOA and FaHA. The first line of enforcement at
depository lenders comes from the financial regulatory agencies,
which, as noted earlier, have jointly developed a set of enforcement
procedures (FFIEC 1999). These procedures, as implemented by the
Federal Reserve, are described in Calem and Canner (1995).
Alternative procedures developed by the Office of the Comptroller
of the Currency are described by Stengel and Glennon (1999) and
Courchane, Nebhut, and Nickerson (2000).

Traditional Enforcement Methods
Calem and Canner (1995) begin by describing what they call “the
traditional fair-lending enforcement method.”
To help assess the consistency of underwriting
decisions, examiners traditionally have applied a
technique known as “comparative loan file review” or
“matched-pair analysis.”...The examiners begin by
selecting a sample of applications. Next, they note on
“Applicant Profile Worksheets” the key factors
considered in the underwriting decision, and the
disposition of each application. The examiners then
evaluate the information on these spreadsheets to
identify potential instances of disparate treatment of
similarly qualified applicants. (pp. 118-119)
They then discuss various problems with this approach. Our own
evaluation, which is presented below, builds on this analysis.
According to Calem and Canner,
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The traditional matched-pair examination procedure
suffers from two important limitations. First, it is
difficult for examiners to find applicants that are
perfect, or even close, matches; some differences in
underlying financial or property related characteristics
nearly always remain.
Such differences in creditworthiness make it difficult to
identify cases of unequal treatment. Even if there exist
close matches among an institution’s files, it may be
difficult for an examiner to find them through manual
effort alone. Moreover, in some instances, there may
not be many close matches among the pool of
applicants.
The second difficulty with the traditional matched-pair
approach is that even if some differences in treatment
are detected, it is hard to determine whether these are
isolated events that do not result from discrimination, or
the result of a pattern or practice of discrimination.
Differences in treatment observed for a particular
“matched pair” could be a purely random outcome of
the underwriting process. (p. 119)
Another way to express these limitations is to say that it is difficult,
if not impossible, to make judgments about the use of a multivariate
procedure, such as loan underwriting, using one pair of
observations. A multivariate procedure is one in which a decision is
based on the weighted values of several different variables. In the
case of underwriting, a comparison of one minority and one white
application yields valid inferences about the treatment of that
minority applicant only if those two applications are both
comparable on all applicant, loan, and property characteristics and
representative of other loans with those characteristics. This is an
extremely demanding standard. Moreover, any procedure that does
not meet the two above conditions could run into several problems
not mentioned by Calem and Canner. For example, a case in which a
minority applicant is expected to meet a higher standard could be
mistaken for a case in which “comparable” minority and white
applications are both approved.
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The Use of Regression Procedures by Fair-lending
Enforcement Agencies
Several fair-lending enforcement agencies have supplemented
traditional enforcement procedures with regression analysis for
individual large lenders. This approach has been used, for example,
by the Justice Department (Siskin and Cupingood 1996), the Office
of Comptroller of the Currency (Stengel and Glennon 1999;
Courchane, Nebhut, and Nickerson 2000), and the Federal Reserve
Board (Calem and Canner 1995; Avery, Beeson, and Calem 1997;
Calem and Longhofer forthcoming).
Calem and Canner (1995) explain that these procedures were
developed at the Federal Reserve in an attempt to overcome the
limitations of traditional enforcement techniques. The Federal
Reserve’s regression-based technique involves supplementing
HMDA data for a sample of loan applications, both minority and
white, submitted to a particular lender.
Once the data have been collected, the next step in the procedure is
to estimate a loan-approval regression.
To gauge the effect of applicant race on the disposition
of loan applications, examiners, in consultation with
Reserve Bank economists, construct a statistical model
of the lender’s underwriting decisions. This model is
developed on the basis of information gathered from the
bank’s written underwriting guidelines and from
interviews with loan officers. Factors considered
important to the decision of whether to approve an
application are included as explanatory variables in the
model of loan disposition. (p. 121)
The next step involves interpreting the results of this regression.
If the results of the statistical analysis indicate that the
race of the applicant is a statistically significant
predictor of loan disposition, then this is viewed as an
initial indication that a pattern or practice of
discrimination may exist.
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However, the statistical model is necessarily an
abstraction that can only partially replicate the loan
approval process. Each and every factor that might
reasonably influence an underwriting decision cannot
possibly be incorporated into a model. Therefore, the
statistical results alone are not considered definitive. In
order to more fully evaluate the discrimination issue,
examiners select specific loan files for closer review.
(p. 123)
The loan files selected for further review are minority/white pairs
consisting of “minority applicants who have been denied credit and
who appear as well qualified as, or better than, white applicants who
were approved” (Calem and Canner 1995, 123). For these file pairs,
which appear to involve discrimination, the examiners try to identify
a legitimate business explanation for the relatively unfavorable
treatment of the minority applicant. If any such explanation is
found, the file is not considered to be a case of discrimination. As
Calem and Canner (1995, 124) put it, “examiners may find that
factors omitted from the model may account for these decisions.”
See also Calem and Longhofer (forthcoming) and Stengel and
Glennon (1999).
Although similar to those developed by the Federal Reserve, the
Office of the Comptroller of the Currency (OCC) procedures
described by Courchane, Nebhut, and Nickerson (2000) place more
weight on the statistical analysis and less weight on the follow-up
comparisons of loan files.

What Is Wrong with the Fair-Lending
Enforcement System?
The new regression procedures used by several fair-lending
enforcement agencies are valuable contributions to the fair-lending
enforcement system. Most importantly, they recognize that building
a prima facie case for discrimination requires a multivariate
procedure. Even with these new procedures, however, this system
retains two serious limitations: it misses many instances of
disparate-treatment discrimination and it fails to look for disparateimpact discrimination at all.17
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The Need to Obtain an Accurate Estimate of
Disparate-Treatment Discrimination
Enforcement procedures to measure disparate-treatment
discrimination should, of course, be as accurate as possible.
According to the official interagency definition, discrimination in
loan approval exists when, among other things, lenders “use
different standards in determining whether to extend credit” to
people in a legally protected class (FFIEC 1999, ii). The
underwriting standards to which this definition applies depend upon
many applicant, loan, and property characteristics. These standards
cannot be directly observed but must instead be inferred from the
actions taken by lenders through the use of a multivariate statistical
procedure; in other words, an accurate enforcement procedure
requires a multivariate analysis.
The new regression procedures used by fair-lending enforcement
agencies represent a significant step in the right direction because
they recognize this principle. Compared to traditional file reviews,
in other words, these regressions lead to a process that is more likely
to find discrimination when it exists and less likely to find
discrimination when it does not exist. As they are currently
designed, however, the file-review procedures used by the Federal
Reserve appear to forget this principle and therefore have the
potential to undermine the gains from using regressions. The
problem here lies not with file reviews as such, but instead with the
way information from file reviews is used by some enforcement
agencies.
To be specific, information from post-regression file reviews can be
used in two ways. The first way, which is the one built into the
Federal Reserve procedure, is to search for “information that would
legitimately account for the divergent credit decisions” (Calem and
Canner 1995, 124), that is, for benign explanations for cases in
which minority applicants appear to have been treated less favorably
than comparable whites.
Unfortunately, however, this approach runs into exactly the same
problems as traditional file reviews, namely, that it may be difficult
to identify comparable files and any two files identified as
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comparable may still differ in important ways. Calem and Canner
admit this when they say that their new procedure “is very similar to
the ‘matched-pair’ technique traditionally used by examiners” (p.
123). However, they go on to argue that the new approach is better
because “the statistical model guides the identification of matched
pairs for review” (p. 123). It is no doubt true that the quality of the
matches is improved through the use of the statistical model, but a
model cannot eliminate the problem. Even if two matched files have
identical values for “key underwriting variables,” they are bound to
differ on some other characteristics, and it is not logically possible
for a file review to determine the impact of these differences on the
underwriting decision. In short, a file review cannot provide an
alternative test for the hypothesis that discrimination exists.
The information from post-regression file reviews can also be used
to improve the regression specification or to do tests for the
robustness of the results. The OCC procedures in Courchane,
Nebhut, and Nickerson (2000) appear to follow this approach. This
second way of using the information is consistent with the principle
that underwriting discrimination cannot be identified without a
multivariate procedure. Consider the examples provided by Calem
and Canner (1995). If some applicants are unable to document all
reported income, then regulators should re-estimate the regression
with an “unable to document” variable. If underwriters make a
distinction between revolving debt and installment debt in scoring
late payments, then regulators should estimate a regression that
incorporates this distinction. These revised regressions would make
full use of the information in the file reviews without giving up the
regression’s multivariate structure.
Another way to put this is that file reviews may be able to identify
underwriting factors that were missed in an initial regression, but
they cannot determine the weights placed on these underwriting
factors. As explained earlier, these weights cannot be directly
observed but instead must be inferred using multivariate statistics. It
is not logically possible to determine whether a newly identified
underwriting factor can explain a minority rejection without
estimating the weight placed on this factor by the lender—and
controlling for other factors.
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The lesson from this analysis is that a formal test for disparatetreatment discrimination requires a multivariate underwriting model
estimated with a carefully determined specification and carefully
collected data. The specification of this model should reflect, as
fully as possible, a lender’s stated underwriting standards, and it
should, to the extent possible, incorporate lessons learned from
interviews or file reviews. Fair lending laws require lenders to use
the same underwriting standards for all applicants, regardless of
their group membership. Allowing lenders to evaluate applications
on the basis of idiosyncratic factors and to place unobservable
weights on these factors in making their underwriting decisions
eviscerates these laws by making it impossible to determine whether
common standards are applied to all applicants. Thus, fair lending
laws cannot be enforced unless lenders are held to a standard of
equal treatment based on an available and objective standard,
namely, a multivariate analysis of the lender’s loan-denial decisions.
Because a regression analysis inevitably involves judgments, a
lender should, of course, be allowed to comment on a regression
analysis that finds it practices disparate-treatment discrimination. In
our view, a thoughtfully conducted loan-approval regression that
finds a significantly higher loan-denial rate for minorities than for
whites, controlling for credit characteristics, establishes a prima
facie case for disparate-treatment discrimination and therefore shifts
the burden of proof onto the lender. In this situation, the lender can
escape the charge of disparate-treatment discrimination only if it can
provide an alternative regression specification that is consistent with
its expressed underwriting policies (and with principles of
regression methodology) and that indicates no significant difference
in loan approval between minority and white applicants.

The Need to Look for Disparate-Impact Discrimination
Both the traditional enforcement policies and the regression-based
policies developed by several fair-lending enforcement agencies
also have another major flaw: they are incapable of identifying most
cases of disparate-impact discrimination. In fact, as stated in Avery,
Beeson, and Calem (1997), Stengel and Glennon (1999), and
Courchane, Nebhut, and Nickerson (2000), the explicit purpose of
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the regression-based procedures is to identify disparate-treatment
discrimination alone. As Avery and his colleagues (1997) put it:
In any statistical analysis of discrimination (parametric
or nonparametric), the goal is to determine whether or
not the treatment of an individual would have been
different had the individual been of a different minority
status. (p. 14)
This is a textbook definition of disparate-treatment discrimination
and it completely ignores behavior that has a disparate impact on
members of a minority group. The fair-lending enforcement
agencies are responsible for identifying both disparate-treatment and
disparate-impact discrimination, and it makes no sense to rely
exclusively on methods that, in effect, simply look the other way
when confronted with the possibility of disparate-impact
discrimination.
As shown by Ross and Yinger (forthcoming), disparate-impact
discrimination can enter a loan-approval regression in two ways.
First, it can show up in the estimated difference in loan approval
between minority and white applicants, controlling for credit
characteristics, if the regression specification does not exactly
accurately reflect a lender’s actual underwriting standards. Second,
it can show up in the estimated weights for the credit characteristics,
and therefore will not be recognized as discrimination in a loanapproval regression.
The first possibility needs to be considered because it helps to show
why looking for disparate-impact discrimination is so important.
Specifically, an investigator following the Federal Reserve
procedures (or a lender responding to them) might be able to reduce
apparent discrimination, as indicated by the estimated minoritywhite difference in loan approval, controlling for credit
characteristics, by introducing a lender’s idiosyncratic, but
illegitimate, underwriting standards into the specification of the
regression. This step could shift the effect of disparate-impact
discrimination from the estimated minority-white difference in loan
approval to the estimated weights of individual credit
characteristics, where it will not be observed. Thus, the search for
the “correct” specification, that is, the specification most accurately
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portraying a lender’s underwriting criteria, a search that is central to
the logic of the Federal Reserve’s regression procedure, can be seen
as a way to ensure that disparate-impact discrimination is ignored.
The problem runs even deeper than this, however. As shown in such
a compelling fashion by Buist, Linneman, and Megbolugbe (1999)
and Blackburn and Vermilyea (2001), lenders may be able to hide
disparate-treatment discrimination by transforming it into disparateimpact discrimination. In this case, the Federal Reserve’s regression
procedure could miss discrimination altogether, even when it is
severe. Indeed, we believe it is inappropriate—if not irresponsible—
for these agencies to use a procedure that violates the FFIEC guide
by assuming that disparate-treatment discrimination is the only kind
worth looking for.

How Can the Fair-Lending Enforcement System
Be Improved?
In our judgment, the current fair-lending enforcement system is
seriously inadequate because it is likely to miss some cases of
discrimination in loan approval that take the form of disparate
treatment and is incapable of identifying loan-approval
discrimination that takes the form of disparate-impact.18
We propose three steps for eliminating these flaws.
1. The fair-lending enforcement agencies should come up with
the resources needed to make certain that they are not
missing a large share of existing disparate-treatment
discrimination. Multivariate regressions should be employed
by all these agencies; these methods should be based on
virtually complete information; and loan file reviews should
be treated as a method for improving, not overruling,
regression analysis.
2. These agencies should conduct loan-approval regressions
based on applications submitted to a large sample of lenders.
These regressions should recognize the complexity of
underwriting standards and the possibility that these
standards vary systematically across lenders based on their
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loan portfolios. This tool makes it possible to estimate the
extent of discrimination by each lender in the sample,
regardless of whether that discrimination takes the form of
disparate impact or of disparate treatment. Moreover,
because it is based on a large sample, this tool provides
precise estimates of the weights placed on a wide range of
underwriting variables, yields an estimate of discrimination
even for lenders that are too small for current regression
procedures, and eliminates the arbitrary separation of
lenders based on the agency that regulates them. In short,
this tool provides the best possible lender-specific estimates
of discrimination that are available without loanperformance information and is an ideal way to determine if
there is a prima facie case for discrimination by any lender
in the sample.
A lender should of course be allowed to build a businessnecessity defense. In this case, however, a lender cannot
mount such a defense by adding its own idiosyncratic
underwriting criteria to a loan-approval regression. Not only
can a lender hide intentional discrimination by manipulating
its underwriting weights, but, as shown earlier, these weights
may reflect discrimination even if they are based on an
apparently group-neutral analysis of loan performance.
Instead, a lender cannot defend the underwriting weights it
uses on business necessity grounds unless it can demonstrate
that these weights do a better job of predicting loan
performance (as measured, say, by loan default) than the
weights implied by the enforcement agency’s regression.
Following the non-discrimination test developed earlier, this
demonstration must apply within each ethnic group, not to
all groups combined.
3. The fair-lending enforcement agencies should implement a
performance-based analysis of loan-approval decisions to
supplement the first tool. This second enforcement tool
requires an enforcement agency to estimate a model of the
factors that determine loan default or some other measure of
loan performance, which is the type of model on which an
automated underwriting system is based. More specifically,
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this tool compares the minority composition of the
applications that have the highest predicted loan
performance based on this loan-performance model with the
minority composition of the applications a lender actually
approves.19 Discrimination exists if significantly more
minority applications would be approved on the basis of the
agency’s predicted performance than are actually approved
on the basis of the lender’s underwriting standards.
This tool requires information on loan performance and on
credit characteristics for a large sample of loans, which the
fair-lending agencies have, so far, been reluctant to obtain,
even though they have the power to do so. However, it does
not require the investigator to know the formulas behind a
lender’s underwriting standards or credit scores, which may
be considered proprietary. This tool, like the previous one,
captures both disparate-impact and disparate-treatment
discrimination but cannot tell them apart.
This tool would yield more precise answers about
discrimination than the first tool, but it would obviously be
more costly to implement. Loan performance is observed by
the institution servicing a loan, which may not be the same
as the institution that issued the loan. To examine
discrimination in underwriting, therefore, regulators must
develop procedures that link loan performance information
with information about the issuing lender. These issues arise
even for large lenders that originate and then continue to
service many loans. After all, these lenders also sell some of
their loans on the secondary market, and the sample of loans
they retain is not a random sample of the loans they
originate.
To build a business-necessity defense in this case, a lender
would have to show that its underwriting weights are
derived from a loan-performance model that does a better
job of predicting within-group loan performance than does
the model estimated by regulators. If an enforcement agency
has made a prima facie case for discrimination and the
lender cannot supply an alternative loan-performance model
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that meets this non-discrimination test, then the third part of
a disparate-impact case is automatically satisfied. Under
these circumstances, the loan-performance model estimated
by the enforcement agency provides an alternative
underwriting scheme that meets the lender’s legitimate
business objectives without any discrimination.
Although our second and third recommendations would require
lenders to provide information from their loan files, they are
designed, in part, to protect lenders from unwarranted charges of
discriminatory behavior. Recall that we recommend stringent
standards for establishing a prima facie case for disparate-impact
discrimination, based on a multivariate procedure. Regulators
should make it clear that the selection of a lender for further
investigation does not imply that the regulator has already built a
prima facie case for discrimination by that lender. Just as an incometax audit does not imply that a taxpayer has cheated on his taxes, a
lending investigation does not imply that a lender has practiced
discrimination. Instead, a lender is charged with discrimination only
if a statistical procedure finds a minority-white disparity after
controlling for all legitimate underwriting variables. With these
procedures, a lender that does not discriminate has nothing to worry
about.
Despite their unique ability to collect the relevant data, the fairlending enforcement agencies have decided not to provide the public
with any credible evidence on the current extent of discrimination in
mortgage underwriting. As in the case of fair-lending enforcement,
they apparently favor looking the other way. Consequently, neither
we nor anyone else knows how much of this discrimination still
exists. According to the best available evidence, however, extensive
underwriting discrimination existed in 1990, and there is no more
recent evidence to show that this discrimination has gone away.
Moreover, black and Hispanic households continue to have
homeownership and loan-approval rates that are far below the rates
attained by white households, even after controlling for income and
other factors (Gyourko, Linneman, and Wachter 1999).
Under these circumstances, this nation cannot begin to live up to the
important principles embodied in its fair-lending laws without
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actively searching for mortgage discrimination in all its possible
forms, using the most accurate tools possible. The current fairlending enforcement system does not even come close to meeting
this standard.
It does not have to be this way. More comprehensive and accurate
enforcement tools that build on a large body of scholarly research
and are consistent with legal standards are readily available. We
strongly urge the fair-lending enforcement agencies to make these
tools a regular part of their enforcement activities. We also urge
interested citizens, community groups, academics, lenders and other
participants in the mortgage market, and public officials to work for
improvements in the fair-lending enforcement system. Every
American household should be able to enter the mortgage market
feeling confident that it will not encounter discrimination.

Endnotes
1

FaHA and ECOA also prohibit “redlining,” defined as unfavorable
actions by a lender toward loans involving properties in
neighborhoods where members of a protected class are located.
Redlining is not considered in this policy brief.

2

U.S. Code Title 15, Chapter 41, Section 1691.

3

Nondepository lenders obtain mortgage capital from investors in
the secondary mortgage market, instead of from deposits. These
investors want to receive their income in the form of mortgage
interest payments. See the citations in note 14.

4

For a more detailed discussion of the enforcement duties of these
two agencies, see Schwemm (1994) or Yinger (1995).

5

A fourth reason, which is too technical for full discussion in this
policy brief, is that discrimination may be profitable, and therefore
may not be eliminated by competition. For more on this view, see
Ferguson and Peters (2000), Longhofer and Peters (1998), and Ross
and Yinger (forthcoming).
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6

Avery et al. (1996) discuss several other HMDA results that are
consistent with, but do not prove, the existence of discrimination.

7

See FFIEC (2001b), which is the source of all the numbers in this
paragraph. The pre-1995 HMDA data are not comparable to data for
1995 and later years. See Scheessele (1998).

8

Munnell et al. (1996) also explored a wide range of alternative
specifications for their estimating equation and found that their
result was remarkably robust to these changes.

9

Several scholars have also argued that Munnell et al. (1996) should
have looked at loan defaults, not loan approvals. Ross and Yinger
(forthcoming) examine this argument in detail and show that it is not
correct.

10

The federal fair-lending agencies have the authority to collect the
information needed to replicate this study but they have not done so.
This lack of replication is itself a powerful indictment of these
agencies. In our judgment, one of the principal responsibilities of
any civil-rights enforcement agency is to educate the public on the
magnitude of the problem.
11

The trends in the HMDA data do not, of course, prove that
discrimination remains at its 1990 level. In principle, a decline in
discrimination since 1990 could have been accompanied by a
deterioration in the relative creditworthiness of black and Hispanic
applicants. We know of no evidence, however, that this type of
deterioration has taken place.
12

Because of this possibility, civil rights laws that only cover
disparate-treatment discrimination have an enormous loophole.
13

Both Buist, Linneman, and Megbolugbe (1999) and Blackburn and
Vermilyea (2001) interpret their results as evidence that one cannot
tell whether lenders practice disparate-treatment discrimination,
practice disparate-impact discrimination, or simply use different
underwriting standards on legitimate business grounds. As
explained earlier, however, Ross and Yinger (forthcoming) rule out
the third possibility (using the same data as Buist, Linneman, and
Megbolugbe (1999)). Moreover, Blackburn and Vermilyea (2001)
show that inter-group differences in loan approval are explained by
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across-lender differences in the definitions of underwriting
variables, not in the weights placed on common underwriting
variables. (For example, one lender might have special rules for
mortgages with a loan-to-value ratio, LTV, above 0.90, whereas
another might use an LTV cut-off of 0.95.) It seems unlikely that
these idiosyncratic differences in definitions are justified by a link to
performance data, which would be required for a business-necessity
defense.
14

The increased reliance on automated underwriting is related to
several other trends, including a trend toward “unbundling” various
mortgage services, the emergence of mortgage bankers, and the
growth of the secondary mortgage market. See Follain and Zorn
(1990), LaCour-Litttle (2000), Lea (1996), Ross and Yinger
(forthcoming), and Van Order (2000).
15

The actual statistical procedures are considered proprietary and are
not released, but the available descriptions of the schemes never
mention group membership variables.
16

In technical terms, this is an example of omitted variable bias in a
regression analysis. See Ross and Yinger (forthcoming).
17

Several other weaknesses of the current enforcement system are
discussed in Ross and Yinger (forthcoming).
18

The fair-lending enforcement system could also do a better job
preventing discrimination in lender actions other than loan approval,
such as loan pricing. See Ross and Yinger (forthcoming).
19

If a lender has approved A applications, then this test compares the
minority composition of approved loans with that of the A highestranking applications according to the enforcement agency’s loanperformance model. See Ross and Yinger (forthcoming).
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